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Abstract
A model of dynamic brain function based on the work of Wal-
ter Freeman offers a more satisfactory account of free will than
alternative accounts that attempt to confirm or reject it. Freeman
has shown us that mammalian brains function between open-ended
information gathering and cycles of practiced response to form a
rhythm which engages us with the world. This kind of response
cannot be explained in agent-causal or mechanistic terms. These
models offer a stark choice between action as independent of exter-
nal causes, or as a product of physical parts and processes internal
to an organism. A neurodynamic model conceives of the will as a
continuous action-producing neurocognitive process shaped by the
organism’s interaction with its surroundings and its imagined and
self-originating continuation of a set of rhythms in responding to
them. These rhythms confront us with the fragility of our own exis-
tence and adaptation, which cannot be unpacked like an industrial
system or digitalized like a computer program. The fluidity of our
interaction with the world and the fragility of our being are more
adequately dealt with by continental thinkers than recent analytic
philosophy. Both are naturalistic, but the former are more open to
human creativity and a sense of freedom to which we can aspire.
1. The Freeman Model of Dynamic Brain Function:
A Lifelong Interaction
The pattern of interaction with the world realized by an individual de-
velops over the individual’s lifetime into a characteristic way of being in
the world. In Wittgenstein’s terms, these are “ways of going on” at indi-
vidual and collective levels (Wittgenstein 1953, pp. 179ff). These cannot
be fully described or prescribed in cognitive or abstract terms because they
are personal styles, techniques or characteristic modes of sensorimotor in-
teraction with the physical and social environment. Examples include
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tying a knot or curving a ball into the net in football. Freeman has shown
us the dynamic brain in action in several carefully researched experiments
on living animals with normally functioning brains. One finds that the
brain oscillates between an information-gathering mode and a practiced
routine of response (Freeman 2000, 2001, Freeman et al. 2009, Buzsaki
and Freeman 2015).
The discovery was originally made by looking at the processing activ-
ity of live rabbit brains. But the relevance of Freeman’s neurodynamic
model is much wider (Bressler et al. 2018). It tracks the brain from
engagement with the environment through acquiring and processing in-
formation to the development of adaptive behaviors in human subjects.
One significant implication of this model, specifically its inclusion of a
perception-action cycle, is that neural oscillations and synchronization
generate the capacity for intentionality and decision-making necessary to
engage in these behaviors (Fuster 2013, pp. 87ff, Freeman and Changeux
2015, Liljenstrom 2018). These processes maintain an equilibrium in the
brain allowing neurocognitive control of our thought and action.
Over the history of the organism, the motor effects of this routine form
a set of skills. These skills involve the whole brain and its associative ten-
dencies. They involve activity at both brain-systems and mental-systems
levels. These systems are entangled as representational streams that in-
form and guide action (Freeman and Vitiello 2016). The motor and cog-
nitive capacities generated by interaction between the systems enable us
to form intentions and execute them in actions in response to external
events.
By providing us with the capacity to respond appropriately to events
in executing intentions, neurocognitive control provides us with free will
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp. 28ff, Bratman 2007). This model has a
structure which is dynamic and evolving so that it provides a way to fash-
ion novel responses from the inherited behavioral patterns of the animal
species. These responses can be melded into a new set of skills. Thus,
the behavior at any time can be assembled under the influence of open-
ended sensorimotor interaction with the environment and the subsequent
development of a regular rhythm of activity from it. According to this dy-
namic, the animal senses and then responds to the environmental effects
of its activity.
The sensorimotor system steadily develops over the lifetime of an ani-
mal and ultimately in evolutionary time as the species undergoes genetic
and environmental change. The rhythms range in time scales from mi-
croseconds to millennia. This process results in the gradual emergence of
a wide repertoire of responses, each with its own conditions of emergence.
Each response arises from a core of responses that have a strongly genetic
component for an increasingly distinct genetic cluster of species with its
own course of differentiation and distinctive developmental features. In-
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dividual acts follow a probabilistic rather than deterministic pattern and
thus are not predictable (cf. Haynes 2010).
This holistic, or interactionist, model provides a more plausible ex-
planation of human behavior than an agent-causal model focusing on the
agent as the origin of action unaffected by natural laws and events in
the past (Kane 1996, Clarke 2003, Strawson 2010). It is also more plau-
sible than a mechanistic model focusing on internal parts and processes
that realize organism-level functions in a bottom-up way (Craver 2007,
Bechtel 2008). These models ignore or fail to pay adequate attention
to brain-mind-environment interaction. The animal’s brain is involved
in this activity as a unified site of inclusive information processing and
response. It is not easily dissected into identifiable compartments, each
with its own, proper causal and measurable triggering conditions.
There are rhythms of response involving the whole animal. As Gyorgy
Buzsaki (2006, p. 276) states,
the neuronal “signal” in response to a given environmental pertur-
bation of the brain state is not an initial condition but part of an
ever-changing pattern in the brain’s landscape.
In response to an inclusive mode of information gathering in interaction
with the environment, the animal develops new patterns of activity. The
more familiar and settled the environment, the more characteristic will
the responses be. But the tendency for incremental innovation originat-
ing in the animal itself is always there. These constantly evolving rhythms
enable the animal to meet current adaptive requirements and anticipate
contingencies. They enable behavior control in the neurocognitive real-
ization of free will (Gillett 2015). Freedom and creativity in choosing
between alternative courses of action is a function of the cerebral cortex
in its reciprocal interaction with the environment (Fuster 2013, pp. 77ff).
A neurodynamic model aligns with Buzsaki’s model of a hierarchy of
multiple parallel loops in the brain. These dynamic functions involve ex-
citatory loops between the thalamus and neocortex and inhibitory loops
between the basal ganglia and cerebellum. Balanced excitatory and in-
hibitory neural processes, and the mental processes that emerge from
them, promote adaptability and effective navigation of the world. Ac-
cording to Buzsaki (2006, p. 31),
the main pathways are genetically determined, but the fine-tuning
of connections (“calibration” by the output-input match) is under
the supervision of the body, environment, and interactions with
other brains.
The difference between highly connected and fast-acting conscious ac-
tion systems and the unconscious functions of behavior coordination and
practiced routines are highlighted by such events as basal ganglia lesions.
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These do not affect the cognitive contents of consciousness but have a
profound effect on motor coordination and patterning.
Neural, mental and social factors are necessary to explain how we
reason, decide and act. Some neuroscientists have challenged this view.
In experiments conducted in the 1980s involving subjects who were asked
to flex their wrist or finger, Benjamin Libet noted that unconscious brain
events preceded the conscious intention to flex by 300 to 500 milliseconds.
Readiness potentials in cortical brain regions were recorded by EEG (Libet
1985). Libet (2004, p. 8) concluded that
the discovery that the brain unconsciously initiates the volitional
process well before the person becomes aware of an intention or
wish to act voluntarily ... clearly has a profound impact on how we
view the nature of free will.
For many neuroscientists, the impact has been negative. Based on Libet’s
experiments, Patrick Haggard (2005, p. 91) claims that, because “con-
scious intention occurs after the onset of preparatory brain activity, [it]
cannot ... cause our actions”.
Alfred Mele has argued that the timing of conscious intention in these
experiments does not prove that it has no causal role in the outcome.
Unconscious cerebral initiative alone does not provide a complete causal
explanation of our decisions and actions. In addition to a proximal in-
tention to act at a specific time, a distal intention at an earlier time can
influence the content of and motivation to form and execute the proximal
intention in the action (Mele 2009, pp. 45 ff., 2014). Equally important,
Haggard (2008, p. 944) notes that the ability to respond to factors external
to the brain can influence neural processes:
Interestingly, both decisions [to act or not act] have a strong nor-
mative element; although a person’s brain decides the actions that
they carry out, culture and education teach people what are accept-
able reasons for action, what are not, and when a final predictive
check should recommend withholding action. Culture and educa-
tion therefore represent powerful learning signals for the brain’s
cognitive-motor circuits.
Emphasising that human actions have a complex set of causes, Haggard
(2011, p. 23) states that these causes “reflect the flexibility and complexity
of our response to our environment”.
These comments are consistent with Buzsaki’s explanation of brain
function and how it is shaped by a person’s interaction with the environ-
ment. They are also consistent with a broad interpretation of Freeman’s
neurodynamic model. Neural oscillations and synchronization generate
and sustain intention and action-perception in decision-making through
the brain’s response to factors external to it.
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2. A Situated Agent
Animals navigate continuously through different dynamic situations.
Each of these situations has an almost infinitely varied configuration of
notional elements. These situations and elements create many interactive
centers of neurocognitive activity. There are other connections between
things which are not easily identifiable but color the overall ethos or at-
mosphere in which events are normally encountered. These connections
affect the ecological situations which are variously able to be character-
ized by explicit specification. As dynamic and interactive animals, we can
alter an encounter in many subtle ways by our engagement with it. That
makes the problem of “retro-thinking” this dynamic almost impossible
because it fails to capture the natural feel of the encounter – of why you
might say this or that or do just what you, in fact, do.
Language has developed the complex grammatical apparatus of ref-
erence and predication (Gillett 1992) to enable us to differentiate and
communicate about a whole variety of situations in which objects, their
specifications and activity, become communicable without major ambigu-
ity. In this way, we pass on to the group of which we are part complex
techniques of adaptation, which become cultural knowledge and styles of
interaction. This knowledge shapes the plans we form and execute in
adaptive self-making (Gallagher 2020, pp. 218ff).
These settled patterns of interaction are so characteristic between and
among different human groups that our “ways of going on” carry a cul-
tural signature which operational and cybernetic models cannot incorpo-
rate. Wittgenstein continually attacks such models as part of his critical
remarks about rule-following as an example of agency and understanding
in his Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953, pp. 138–242). This
activity involves a process of epigenetic development which results in a
culture with a distinct style of being. In his Brain and Culture, Bruce
Wexler (2006, pp. 3f) makes the epigenetic point that it is the
ability to shape the environment that in turn shapes our brains
that has allowed human adaptability and capability to develop at a
much faster rate than is possible through alteration of the genetic
code itself.
These actions contribute to our identity and show themselves in the way
we describe and name ourselves. The latter activity also carries the dis-
tinctive mark of family and history.
The family or cultural identity that we come to inhabit is comprised
of ways of going on, or styles of living, that equip us as agents. This is
not a random activity, in the sense of being disengaged from a context
or ecological niche, but instead is deeply reflective of our shared and par-
ticularly familial experience. It is not caused by conditions in the world
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but represents the way we navigate it based on what we know and have
learned. In this sense, each of us makes our distinctive mark on the world
and carries an identity which is worth demarcating by a proper name. It
allows us to track our interactive and complex development of agency.
A proper name has a singular reference. It denotes an individual and
not just a type, however well the latter is described. It is instructive
that our grammar has a special place for this feature of our lives, and
it has attracted a philosophical literature all its own. For Wittgenstein,
grammar tells us a great deal about a thing, and this includes ourselves
as objects in the world. But the rhythms of life we inhabit are so de-
scriptively elusive that it is no wonder that we have no singular way of
talking about ourselves. This makes human action difficult to character-
ize because grammatical individuation devices are not among the terms
of a scientific account of thought or movement. We develop concepts in
cognitive psychology as a science by rendering them into general scientific
terms. The scientific categories of agency refer to named types with de-
scriptors that can become part of our generalizable patterns of knowledge.
3. Constructed and Complex Situations
The human lexicon of speech acts associated with our linguistic ability
enables us to develop ways to characterize and convey our knowledge of
different situations and moments of agency (Austin 1962, Searle 1969).
This cognitive achievement gives us a clear advantage over our animal
cousins, who do not have recourse to this sophisticated and adaptive mode
of responding and sharing behavioral strategies. The endless creativity of
language and the way it serves as one of the major media of art and styles
of action means that abstract scientific and procedural characterizations
of our linguistic ability always seem impoverished by comparison with
our richness of communication with each other. We can convey ways of
looking at the environment and communicating about it by increasing
our information-gathering capacities. This creative aspect also applies
to action and our individual and collective characteristic styles of going
on. We must note, however, this is not the mere repetition of previous
behavior. Rather, it allows for something novel with nuances and color
blended into it by the experience of the agent and the intricacies of a
situation in which he acts.
An individual response is spontaneous in the sense that it is influenced
but not determined by previous events and the context in which it occurs.
All the details of action in a situation, and especially its intentional aspect,
relate the acts, precursors and possible deviance of the agent who acted
at that point in time to a possible departure from rational and moral
norms and the specific end they serve. Each description is a response to
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a situated knowledge of human life and the manoeuvres and techniques
which form cultural rhythms that are potentially innovative. But they
may also form part of the cultural capital of the group. These acquired
and innovative rhythms increase the adaptability of the group. They can
be located in an ecological niche so that they represent an explicit mode
of empowerment that increases the ecological competence of the human
group concerned.
This dynamic goes on at the growing edge of language and human af-
fairs as a constantly changing epigenetic phenomenon. Because it emerges
from an intricate configuration of brain, mind and world, judgments about
such things require acculturated courts who are conversant with all the
details of the situation and common-sense human thinking that occurs
within it. This involves more than just formulaic classifications.
An agent responds to an inflected construction of a situation which
may be novel. Because of the holistic nature of the cerebral response
to any state of affairs, the variations that emerge achieve an epigenetic
advance in behavior that can spread through a group. This may occur
through highly detailed communication and the adverbial modification of
words for action. It may also occur through imitation by any person or
others whom they wish to emulate. The variations within a response to
what has been encountered before form the growing edge of human adap-
tation and our epigenetic endowment. They are an individual departure
from the norm, though the spirit of the norm might be preserved. Such a
phenomenon is not genetically determined but depends upon genetically
endowed features of our cognitive apparatus and action system. These
variations are not merely caused by environmental changes. They are in
part generated by how the agent interprets the situation.
Thus, the new learning of the agent lends its own inflection to a situa-
tion because many of the developed techniques will modify the context in
which they occur. In that sense, the individual response is doubly inno-
vative and conditioned by cognitive factors partly arising in language and
our linguistic means of communicating with and learning from each other
over a lifetime. Indeed, through the written word, this response develops
over the course of history and the shared inheritance of any given culture.
This explication and development of behavioral skills and their dis-
semination through a human group allow for significant development in
historical and not just biological or evolutionary time. This fact facilitates
the capacity of human beings, acting and living together, to rapidly be-
come the apex species in an ecological niche (Fuchs 2017). As apex species
with extensive skills, they are both biologically dominant over their fellow
creatures and in a position to modify that ecological setting for good or
ill.
In our time, we have seen these powers develop to a frightening ex-
tent – “frightening” because our power over the environment sometimes
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threatens the very lifeworld that we inhabit and its delicate balance. That
threat has increased exponentially as human beings have become more em-
powered and less limited by their biological capacities. Our imaginative
tendencies are not limited by the ecology we inhabit because we are able
to envisage fictional and counterfactual worlds in which we are possible
agents.
However, this very transcendence of our limitations can also be a great
danger and allow us to conceive of our actions and their impact in unre-
alistic ways. When combined with powers unprecedented in nature, we
may threaten our own existence on the planet for which we have been
designed. This has been dramatically illustrated in many urban settings,
as the recent COVID-19 lockdown has seen the return of a diversity of
birdlife to our inner cities. This is particularly noticeable in New Zealand,
where urban settings are seeing native birds that have been displaced from
them by introduced species and the modification of their habitats.
4. Behavioral Rule Responses
The behavioral rule-governed responses that develop in a newly en-
countered situation are guided by many factors. These include the shared
experience conveyed in language by a co-operative style of living. Even
in the subhuman world, animals living in a group or collective can learn
from a much broader experience than what is available to a single agent.
This experience is variously named in the human collective as appren-
ticeship, culture, tradition, or group cooperation. The Amish practice of
barn-building is just one example. The rules are merely for the purpose
of passing on the ecologically specific techniques or ways of going on that
the group has explicitly developed in different settings. They are informed
by the history and reservoirs of imagination such as myths and legends.
Because these shared resources are difficult to specify in precise terms
apart from the dynamic engagement with the environment, rule-following
can be contrasted with procedural specifications. One must experience
this engagement rather than master a group of precise prescriptions as is
beloved by mathematically minded philosophers.
No one reflects this view of philosophy more than the early Wittgen-
stein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1921/1961). In
his later work, he realized the error of his ways so that his last book,
On Certainty, is almost a hymn to our collective pragmatic existence and
techniques of going on in response to the demands of the natural and
social milieu (Wittgenstein 1969). Even earlier in the Philosophical In-
vestigations, he rejected the logicism and formalism of the Tractatus and
described “language games” or techniques of communication embedded
in our “forms of life” (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 19ff). Our collective knowl-
edge and social practices generate a context in which biological individuals
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have a propensity to do much better as a communicating group than other
biologically related creatures who developed survival techniques through
different means.
Indeed, it could be called a quantum leap in evolution whereby the
shared skills of individuals, conveyed by differentiated linguistic markers,
provided a flexible and sensitive means of conveying lived experience. This
developed into something much more than imitative troop experience as
a means of skill development. Our lifelong history allows these skills to be
progressively refined so that they are exquisitely adapted to the nuances
and subtleties of a constantly changing ecological setting. Whether that
is encountered naturally or constructed in the imagination, it is a resource
upon which we collectively draw in acting in the world.
5. Modification as Innovation
Such is the process of information gathering in life and the need to
attune the developed interactions and contents of our mental life to our
surroundings. According to Freeman’s neurodynamic model, it is from
these interactions and contents that the neural net develops. A kind of
holism results, such that apparently insignificant features of a stimulus
setting become part of a neural, mental and environmental context that
induces a behavioral response.
What is more, the alternation between periods of real-life engagement
and periods of imagination develops rhythms of response and dissocia-
tion with a deep role in the functioning of the organism. The rhythm of
switching smoothly from one response to another means that a period of
disengagement and refiguring will allow the neural net to allow new pos-
sibilities for action. These periods conveniently occur during sleep when
free association and cognitive imagination and adventurousness can safely
occur.
Strict rules govern our terms of settled engaged communication. But
it is not the same for all our activity because some of it must be allowed
to occur freely, unconstrained to some degree by neural processing and
the sometimes harsh contingencies of the real world. We can call those
periods of freely ranging association and imaginary or unreal response
“dreaming” language and thought. They are constantly shaped by neural
processing but not uniquely determined by it.
Many theories have claimed that thought is either prior to or devel-
opmentally secondary to language. But such ordering by philosophers,
linguists and psychologists is misinformed in construing thought and its
explicit grammatical structure as less than concurrent with and contrib-
utory to language in a dynamic way. This separates mental content from
its natural accompaniment. Instead, thought and language go together
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and resonate to inform imagination and dreaming as essential parts of
engaged human life and shared activities and attainments (Gillett 1992).
This account of elevating human thought above that of animals through
language is correct. But the claim that language is prior and formative
all by itself in relation to cognition is misplaced. Real lived experience
is anchored in objects of acquaintance. These objects, and the fears or
rewards we encounter along with them in nature, is the fons et origo of
all our ways of going on.
Proper names and definite descriptions consisting of names, verbs
and adverbs enable us to differentiate objects in constructing a realis-
tic conception of the world. Building on the Fregean doctrine of reference
and predication, many philosophers and some philosophically minded lin-
guists argue that referents are the basic components of language (Frege
1892/1952). But this doctrine and its descendants fail to capture the
creativity with which we use language to communicate and describe and
explain our actions in different settings. This creativity is a function of
neural, mental and environmental interaction.
Against a Fregean framework, we should always be aware that linguis-
tic communication occurs in the service of dealing with the world through
the identification of singular reference and elaboration by the modifiers.
These are needed to reveal, in a fine-grained way, exactly what the ob-
jects concerned can be used for or modified to. Once we have such a basic
orientation in place, the nature of our self-originating behavioral tech-
niques can be clarified. In relation to the arguments about free will, this
is the liberty of spontaneity rather than the liberty of indifference (Hume
1739/1978, Secs. 407ff, Honderich 2005, p. 48).
For Hume, the liberty of indifference is the absence of causation or
necessity. The liberty of spontaneity does not imply impulsive or nonde-
liberative action. Rather, it is equivalent to the ability to make decisions
free from constraint and act as we choose to act. Consistent with this
type of liberty, free will is the ability to form and execute action plans ac-
cording to one’s own desires, beliefs and reasons. This ability is a function
of neurocognitive control. It aligns in some respects with compatibilist
accounts of free will but, unlike these accounts, is suitably informed by
neuroscience (Dennett 2003, Roskies 2006).
The distinction between the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of
indifference was initially proposed in the mediaeval era and was discussed
then and later by Hume in relation to naturalism and universal causation.
But the present discussion is different. It holds that we are not indifferent
to the world in which we are functioning but instead creatively involved in
seeing it in different ways and acting informed by what we see. Although
this is a kind of spontaneity, it has left behind the strictly causal terms
of the post-industrial debate. It has nested the account of free will in a
re-conception of brain function based on the idea that a human being is
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self-organizing and self-directing through practiced rhythms of responding
to the world.
On this interpretation, the liberty of spontaneity is a matter of creative
originality allowed for in the open-ended flexibility of the neural network
(Fuster 2013, pp. 107ff, 146ff). With its link to dreaming and creativity,
as in art or storytelling, we come upon a purely human innovation which
has nothing to do with a mysterious realm of immaterial substances, but
has everything to do with the flexibility and complexity of our neural net.
That this may disturb but also inspire us is the two-edged complication
of the human condition. The duality of Yin and Yang, heaven and hell,
positivity and negativity, real and imaginary has been a feature of human
thought in all its guises since antiquity. So much is this the case that
whole systems of philosophy have been based on dualistic thinking that
is now rejected by post-industrial naturalism.
In the past, philosophers were faced with a stark choice between mech-
anistic or causal accounts in either a reductionist or vague and undefined
“coming to be” prominent among spiritual and mystical thinkers. The
present view of brain function as a dynamic and fluid interaction with the
world places the agent at the center of this interaction and its formative
effect on the brain and mind. It is spontaneity indeed, as the character
of the agent and her relationships to others are crucial in shaping the
rhythmic resonance that is established between the brain and the con-
stantly changing world. Social factors are crucial to understanding this
kind of spontaneity, which is a narrative and creative reflection of human
engagement with the physical and cultural environment.
The neural and mental functions resulting from this engagement can-
not be formalized in computational terms because they do not follow an
algorithm. These functions change in response to factors internal and
external to the agent. For this reason, a more inclusive dynamic model
suits our ever-changing and fluid adaptation to our being-in-the-world,
as has been suggested by philosophers such as Heidegger (1927/1996),
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) and Sartre (1947/2007). These philosophers
pioneered a type of philosophy that was much more speculative than what
later emerged from the naturalistic work of Wittgenstein. He was clearly
influenced by the style of thinking he found on the continent yet seemed
to be motivated in part by naturalistic realism and not formal or quasi-
mathematical approaches to human cognition. These approaches fail to
explain brain-world interaction and the agent’s ability to navigate the
world based on it.
The early philosophical work in the continental tradition, with its
emphasis on freedom and self-formation, is the proper entree into this
kind of a naturalistic account of free will. This account is open-ended
but not idealistic in the philosophical sense. In the work of Sartre and
Heidegger (1927/1996), we find a repudiation of idealism and a focus
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on action and responsibility for oneself and one’s actions. All this work
is based on the creative mind and its dynamism in a changing world
for which reductionist accounts focusing on parts and processes in the
organism will always be inadequate. No doubt, for that reason, Sartre
has been adopted by creative artists as an inspiration for their work while
being dismissed by many post-industrial analytic philosophers. They tend
to see the brain as a sophisticated machine, or as a digital device executing
formulated prescriptions for action which can be measured and specified
in precise terms. These conceptions entirely miss the fluidity and two-way
dynamism of the relationship between the brain and the world.
6. A Dance of Survival
The idea of a dance is consistent with the idea of both improvisation
and prescribed or pre-rehearsed routines. When we also consider the dis-
ciplines involved in learning a language, we begin to see that it is not
only improvisation that needs to come into view. We act on an infinitely
varying stage which expands into the imagined future and draws on the
remembered past. Our repertoire of techniques is infinitely modifiable but
not unrealistically so. We have our chance at unconstrained adventures
of ideas in dreaming and in the creativity of play. Yet when we get down
to the business of life, contingency and the power of our agency to re-
spond to it are always there to be dealt with. Under their influence, we
have shaped ourselves into creatures who can adapt to different settings.
These settings cannot be formalized in terms of the mathematical com-
plexities we have discovered or the scientific concepts we have conceived
for ourselves because they extend beyond them.
Even our environment is modifiable and at our mercy as we are learn-
ing to transform things that were beyond the abilities of our ancestors.
This exciting and frightening possibility was mythicized in a whole set
of stories which served as warnings to us when we strayed beyond the
well-worn parts of adaptation that we had forged for ourselves through
history. Our increasing alarm in those quarters, where a materialist model
is not well equated with the reach of human thinking and science, is un-
derstandable. We can begin to imagine both what is mathematically and
scientifically conceivable and what our destiny might be if we were able
to transcend our industrial limitations. This kind of cognition may be
described by some as fanciful. But it reflects our hope in an environ-
ment which can be altered by our intervention, an environment which is
frighteningly dependent on our freedom.
The sense of “frighten” here shares much with existentialists such as
Sartre. It is about humanity having to will itself “to be” after being
thrown into existence with all its uncertainties and as-yet unexplored do-
mains of experience. In this brave new world, our freedom to will and act
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is a two-edged sword which has no obvious handle and where our grip on
it also constantly threatens to affect us in ways that may be disabling. It
may open new rhythms that might even be fatal to us and our fellow crea-
tures. This is the existential meaning of freedom. We live with it all the
time as our brains open themselves to life and seek to find ways of action.
These may open new rhythms with which we can resonate and safely live
within the ecological settings into which we are thrown. Viewed within a
broadly continental philosophical framework involving brain-mind-world
interaction, Freeman’s neurodynamic model offers a compelling way of
explaining how we freely plan, decide and act.
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